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Abstract
In this paper, two pairs of complementors have to decide whether to merge and eventually
bundle their products. Depending on the degree of competitive pressure in the market, either
both pairs decide to merge (with or without bundling), or only one pair merges and bundles,
while rivals remain independent. The latter case can very harmful for consumers as it brings
surge in prices. We also consider the case in which one pair moves first. Interestingly, we find
a parametric region where first movers merge but refrain from bundling, to not induce rivals to
merge as well.
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1 Introduction
Recent antitrust decisions about proposed mergers explicitly considered the possibility that the merg-
ing parties may engage in bundling, especially when they produce complementary goods. This point
is extremely delicate. On the one hand, based on the seminal contribution by Cournot (1838), vertical
agreements involving complements tend to reduce prices, by which one could argue a merger between
suppliers of complementary products should be allowed for. On the other hand, since Whinston
(1990), bundling has been deemed as welfare reducing, especially when achieving foreclosure.1 As a
consequence, a vertical merger which involves bundling has to be carefully scrutinized, as it entails
a trade-off between two forces which may have opposite effects on social welfare.
In one of the most controversial cases, the US and the EU severely disagreed on the proposed
merger between General Electric (GE) and Honeywell in 2001. Although the two parties were US-
based multinationals, the merger also fell under the European Merger Control Regulation (MCR)
as their total turnover in the EU amounted to 29 billion euros.2 The US Department of Justice
(DOJ) was broadly in favour, while the European Commission decided to block the merger because
of a possible bundle between GE’s jet aircraft engines and Honeywell’s avionics products.3 The
Commission raised also a second point of concern, which is of interest for this paper: the practical
difficulty for rival suppliers of engines and avionics to respond appropriately, for example by merging
or forming selling consortia and then offering their own competing bundle.4
Another interesting case was the merger between Comcast and NBC Universal (NBCU), approved
in January 2011 by both the Federal Communication Commission (FCC) and the DOJ. The approval
arrived under the condition that other providers maintained access to NBC programming, and that
Comcast made affordable broadband available to its customers without forcing them to subscribe to
a cable bundle. This decision has triggered a lot of criticism as it was argued that such a merger
would certainly charge rivals, such as DirecTV or Verizon Fios, anticompetitive rates to access
Comcast/NBC programming. Moreover, due to the size of the parties involved, it was clear that a
real possibility for rivals to create a direct competitor by merging was extremely limited.5
In general, notwithstanding a growing interest for the impact on society of conglomerate mergers
which may involve bundling, the focus has been directed to the study of market-foreclosure effects.
Scanty attention has been devoted to the possibility that rivals may respond in a similar way, by
1The entry-deterrence use of bundling complement goods has been further investigated by Choi and Stefanadis
(2001), Carlton and Waldman (2002), Nalebuff (2004) and Peitz (2008), inter alii.
2The turnovers of GE and Honeywell in the EU were respectively 23 billion euros 6 billion euros.
3For a brief history of the "transatlantic" divergence between US and EU regarding the GE/Honeywell case, see
Morgan and McGuire (2004).
4The GE/Honeywell controversy reflects well the different views embraced by American and European regulators
regarding bundling, with the former being more tolerant than the latter, since the Chicago School dismissed any form
of leverage theory. In the European competition policy, on the contrary, bundling gained enormous prominence in a
number of recent cases, e.g. Tetra Laval/Sidel, the already mentioned GE/Honeywell and the recent Microsoft case in
which the European Commission ordered the unbundling of the Windows Media Player from Windows.
5The merger between Comcast’s cable systems and NBC Universal’s channels created a media giant as it combined a
major producer of TV and movies with the dominant distributor of TV and movies in big media markets. NBCUniversal
is now 51% owned by Comcast and 49% owned by GE.
2
creating their proper merged entity. The aim of our paper is to cover this gap.
In particular, we consider two pairs of complementors (producers of complementary products)
that compete in the market by setting prices. In the preliminary stage of the game, the two producers
of each pair have to decide whether to remain independent or merge. In the latter case, the merged
entity decides whether to sell the two products separately or in a bundle.
Moreover, as casual observation suggests that mergers usually appear in sequence, we also inves-
tigate the case in which one pair of complementors moves before the other. It is worth remarking
that we abstract from any synergies that may result from merging and/or bundling. Apart from
the timing asymmetry in the sequential game, there are no additional factors which could artificially
create an incentive to merge and to bundle.
The main message of our paper is that the strategic interaction between bundling and merging
depends on the degree of competitive pressure in the market, which in our model is captured by
the interplay between different degrees of product complementarity and brand substitutability.6 In
particular, the following results deserve attention:
1. When competitive pressure is relatively weak (sufficiently high degrees of product complemen-
tarity and/or brand differentiation), both pairs of complementors decide to merge. When this
happens, bundling becomes ineffective.
2. For intermediate levels of competitive pressure in the market, in the simultaneous game both
pairs of complementors bundle. This may give rise to a prisoner’s dilemma, as firms would
have obtained a higher profits by remaining independent. In the sequential game the strategic
interaction between bundling and merging emerges in its true nature: first movers decide to
merge but not to bundle, and this occurs as they want to avoid a profit-harming merging
response by second movers, which remain independent in absence of bundling.
3. When brands are perceived as highly substitutes and/or product complementarity is very weak,
first movers decide to merge and bundle, while second movers refrain from merging. Differently
from the previous case, the latter gain as well from the merging and bundling strategy adopted
by the formers. Co-opetion is therefore at work in such a scenario.
From a social welfare perspective, when both pairs of complementors merge social welfare is at its
highest. All price externalities are internalized and society at large benefits from consuming at the
lowest prices. Remarkably, this socially optimal outcome can be obtained also in presence of bundling,
whose potential negative effect is completely neutralized when both pair of complementors merge.
When only one pair merges without bundling, price externalities are only partially internalized and
this represents the second best result in terms of social welfare.
The worst scenario occurs in the third case listed above. Bundling by one merged entity, when not
accompanied by a second merger, leads to an overall surge in prices, thereby reducing social welfare.
6For terminological purposes, we use products when referring to complements and brands when referring to substi-
tutes.
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This situation occurs when market competition is very intense, and can be explained by the fact that
bundling, by softening brand substitutability in a situation of low product complementarity, allows
independent producers to gain as well. This may represent an interesting case also for the Antitrust
agency, as it highlights a peculiar (and neglected) scenario in which firms strategically decide to not
merge in response of a bundle proposed by rivals, even if they potentially could.
Literature review
Recent theoretical contributions tried to shed light on the interaction between bundling and
mergers in presence of complementary goods. Dalkir et al. (2002) consider a model of quality
differentiation in which there is a single quality leader in each market, with all other firms producing
lower quality products. They demonstrate that a merger of quality leaders in the components has a
negative effect on social welfare as it drives prices up and reduces the choice for consumers. However,
they do not catch the strategic interaction between the merging entity and independent producers,
which is the object of our paper. Evans and Salinger (2002) criticize the Commission’s decision to
prohibit the GE/Honeywell merger. However, their paper is mostly related to the legal controversy
of the merger, and their economic theory does not allow to capture all the different forces at work.7
A paper with a direct economic reference to the GE/Honeywell case is the one by Choi (2008),
who examines mergers in complementary system markets where the merging parties may engage in
bundling. He shows that bundling may have both pro-competitive and anti-competitive effects; yet,
in case of market foreclosure, bundling reduces unambiguously social welfare and the merger should
then be prohibited. The main difference between his contribution and our paper is that we allow for
different degrees of both product complementarity and brand substitutability. Moreover, we consider
a representative consumer who is not forced to buy both products, as each of them is valuable even
when consumed or used alone. It follows that our analysis applies to both mergers which require
different components to be assembled together, like the GE/Honeywell case, and others which do
not, like the Comcast/NBCU one.
Our paper is also related to the strategic incentives to bundle in oligopoly models. Carbajo et
al. (1990) adopt a model with homogeneous goods in market B and valuations for goods A and
B that are perfectly correlated and uniformly distributed across consumers, and demonstrate that
bundling increases product differentiation. When firms compete in prices, bundling softens market
competition and both firms gain; when they compete in quantities, on the contrary, only the bundling
firm gains. In Martin (1999), a multiproduct firm enjoys a monopoly position in one market and
faces competition in the other one. He shows that bundling changes the substitution relationships
between goods to the advantage of the multiproduct firm. In so doing, he adopts a specific demand
system which allows to consider only quantity competition, while we introduce competition in each
horizontally differentiated market.
7They consider a simple model in which two complementary goods are provided by a monopolist and the other is
provided by two firms selling differentiated products.
4
An alternative approach in which bundling is used to segment the market and relax price compe-
tition can be found in Chen (1997). In his model, two firms already produce a homogeneous good and
have to decide whether to introduce a second good bundled with the former. He shows that bundling
emerges as an equilibrium strategy for both firms given that it increases product differentiation.
Gans and King (2006) model the interaction between four producers of two goods to investigate the
consequences of bundled discount to encourage customer loyalty. They found that, even for unrelated
products, a bundled discount has the effect of tying customers to particular product brands, thus
improving the profitability of the firms involved.
The combination of complementary components into composite systems is another close field.
Matutes and Regibeau (1988 and 1992) and Economides (1989) consider fully integrated firms and
show that they prefer compatibility over incompatibility. Farrell et al. (1998) demonstrate that firms
may prefer incompatibility with cost heterogeneity in presence of at least three different varieties
of each component. Denicolò (2000) analyzes compatibility and bundling choices when a generalist
firm offering both components competes against two specialist firms. He shows that incompatibility
or pure bundling may be profitable for the generalist firm when one component is less differentiated
than the other.
Last, but not least, our paper contributes to the literature on ‘Co-opetition’, initially developed
by Brandenburger and Nalebuff (1996). One of the most important results of our paper is that,
when two complementors bundle, all firms increase prices, and there exists an interval region where
individual producers enjoy a higher profit. Casadesus-Masanell et al. (2008) contribute to this
branch or research by presenting Intel and Microsoft as a motivating example on the tension between
cooperation and competition that characterizes relationships between complementors.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the model and includes all the possible
market equilibria resulting from the combinations of strategies adopted by firms. In Section 3 we solve
the simultaneous game, while in Section 4 we consider the more realistic sequential game. In Section
5 we discuss implications for social welfare and provide policy indications. Section 6 concludes.
2 The model
We consider four firms (A1, A2, B1 and B2), two complementary markets (α and β) and four goods
(α1, α2, β1 and β2). Firms A1 and A2 operate in market α and produce respectively α1 and α2,
while B1 and B2 respectively provide β1 and β2 in market β. Goods are considered as imperfect sub-
stitutes within the same market and as imperfect complements between the two markets. As already
mentioned, we refer to brands when considering substitutes and to products when complements.
Moreover, it is assumed that (i) goods α and β are valuable even if consumed alone, and (ii) any
combination of α and β is perceived as equally valuable by the representative consumer.8 As the
level of the demand intercept has no effect on relative prices and quantities, we normalize it to 1.
8Recent decisions taken by the Antitrust agencies impeded the producer to bundle two complements that are
mutually dependent. This is particularly true in high-tech sectors, such as computers (see the Microsoft case).
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The social welfare function that represents such consumer preference takes the following form:
U = m+ (qα1 + qα2 + qβ1 + qβ2)−
1
2
(q2α1 + q
2
α2
+ q2β
1
+ q2β
2
) + (1)
−δ(qα1qβ1 + qα1qβ2 + qα2qβ1 + qα2qβ2)− γ(qα1qα2 + qβ1qβ2),
where m is the amount of the numeraire good, whose price is normalized to 1, qα1 and qα2 (resp.
qβ
1
and qβ
2
) are the quantities of good α (resp. β) produced by firm A1 and A2 (resp. B1 and B2).
Parameter δ ∈ (−1, 0) measures the degree of complementarity between each combination of a α and
β product, while γ ∈ (0, 1) measures the brand substitutability both between α1 and α2 and between
β1 and β2. The implied inverse demand functions are:
pαi = 1− qαi − γqαj − δ
2∑
l=1
qβl , (2)
pβi = 1− qβi − γqβj − δ
2∑
l=1
qαl , (3)
with i, j = 1, 2, i = j, and l = 1, 2.9 This notation will be used henceforth. The above demand
system can be easily inverted to obtain direct demand functions:
qαi =
(1− γ)(1 + γ − 2δ)− (1 + γ − 2δ2)pαi +
[
γ(1 + γ)− 2δ2
]
pαj + δ(1− γ)
∑2
l=1 pβl
(1− γ)
[
(1 + γ)2 − 4δ2
] , (4)
qβi =
(1− γ)(1 + γ − 2δ)− (1 + γ − 2δ2)pβi +
[
γ(1 + γ)− 2δ2
]
pβj + δ(1− γ)
∑2
l=1 pαl
(1− γ)
[
(1 + γ)2 − 4δ2
] , (5)
Lemma 1 Substitutability and complementarity relationships are preserved in the direct demand
system iff γ >
1
2
(
√
1 + 8δ2 − 1) ≡γ.
Proof. see the Appendix.
Therefore, we limit our attention to the interval region where γ >
1
2
(
√
1 + 8δ2−1) ≡γ. Regarding
the cost structure, we assume that the two goods are independent in production and that neither
merging nor bundling yield any cost synergies. Moreover, the constant unit cost of production each
good is supposed to be symmetric across firms and equal to 0.
As for profit functions, (4)-(5) have to be respectively inserted into: (i)
πAl = pαlqαl , πBl = pβlqβl , (6)
when firms Ai and Bi is independent; (ii)
πABi = pαiqαi + pβiqβi , (7)
when Ai and Bi merge (but do not bundle), and the merged entity is labeled AB.
9A similar demand structure can be found in Choi (2008) and Economides and Salop (1992). However, both papers
consider four composite products which are substitutes for one another.
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When the merged entity decides to sell the two products in a package, the bundle is called αβl.
We assume that each bundle consists of one unit of the α and one unit of the β good.10 In order to
obtain the demand functions, the following relation between the number of bundles (qαβl) and the
quantities of the different products need to be inserted in the utility function (see Martin, 1999):
qαβl = qαl = qβl . (8)
Hence, when only one pair of complementors, say i, merges and bundles, while pair j remains
independent or merges without bundling, the social welfare function (1) becomes:
U = m+(2qαβi+qαj+qβj )−
1
2
(2q2αβi+q
2
αj
+q2βj )−δ
[
(qαβi + qαj )(qαβi + qβj )
]
−γqαβi(qαj+qβj). (9)
The implied direct demand curves are:
qαβi =
2(1− γ)− (1 + δ)pαβi + (γ + δ)(pαj + pβj)
2(1− γ)(1 + γ + 2δ)
, (10)
qαj =
2(1− γ)(1− δ)−
[
2(1− δ)− (γ + δ)2
]
pαj − [γ(γ + 2δ)− δ(2 + δ)] pβj + (1− δ)(γ + δ)pαβi
2(1 + γ + 2δ)(1− γ)(1− δ)
(11)
qβj =
2(1− γ)(1− δ)−
[
2(1− δ)− (γ + δ)2
]
pβj − [γ(γ + 2δ)− δ(2 + δ)] pαj + (1− δ)(γ + δ)pαβi
2(1 + γ + 2δ)(1− γ)(1− δ)
(12)
Turning to profit functions, we have to insert (10) in firm i’s profit
πABi = pαβiqαβi (13)
and (12)-(11) in rivals’ profit functions, which are respectively given by (??) if they remain indepen-
dent, and by
πABj = pαjqαj + pβjqβj , (14)
if they merge.
Finally, when both pairs of complementors merge and bundle their products, the social welfare
function (1) writes:
U = m+ 2(qαβi + qαβj )− (q
2
αβi
+ q2αβj )− δ(qαβi + qαβj )
2 − 2γqαβiqαβj . (15)
Direct demand curves are:
qαβi =
2(1− γ)− (1 + δ)pαβi + (γ + δ)pαβj
2(1− γ)(1 + γ + 2δ)
, i, j = 1, 2, i = j, (16)
and they enter into symmetric profit functions:
πABl = pαβlqαβl . (17)
Notice that bundling affects the perceived substitutability and complementarity relations. In
particular:
10See Mantovani (2011) for a thorough discussion.
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Lemma 2 When at least one pair of complementors resorts to bundling, the bundle and the rivals’
products are perceived as substitutes (complements) when γ > −δ (γ < −δ).
Proof. see the Appendix.
The above lemma simply indicates that, in presence of at least one pair of bundling comple-
mentors, it is the relative strength of brand differentiation vis à vis product complementarity that
determines whether the bundle and either the two stand-alone rival products or the alternative bun-
dle are considered as substitutes or complements by the representative consumer. Consider, for
example, γ > −δ: brands are relatively highly substitutable and/or product complementarity is low:
the bundle is perceived as a substitute either to the bundle proposed by rivals or to their alternative
separate products. The opposite holds, mutatis mutandis, when γ < −δ.
3 The simultaneous game
Players interact simultaneously in the market by setting prices. However, there exists a preliminary
stage of the game where each pair of complementors selects a strategy from the following set {Remain
Independent (I), Merging without bundling (M), Merging with bundling (B)}.
The preliminary stage of the game is represented in Table 1, where the first (resp. second)
superscript denotes the strategy of pair i (resp. pair j). Moreover, we use symmetry to simplify the
notation by removing the firm type. As an illustrative example, πMIi = π
MI
Ai
= πMIBi indicates the
profit that each firm in pair i obtains by merging without bundling, when firms in pair j remain
independent, and so on.
Table 1: Payoff matrix
Pair j
Pair i
I M B
I πIIi π
II
j π
IM
i π
IM
j π
IB
i π
IB
j
M πMIi π
MI
j π
MM
i π
MM
j π
MB
i π
MB
j
B πBIi π
BI
j π
BM
i π
BM
j π
BB
i π
BB
j
The game is solved backwards and we start from the market stage. Equilibrium values for prices
and profits are reported in Table 2.11 Two remarks: first, for the sake of comparability, we consider
per firm profits.12 Second, we include only cases II, MI, MM, BI, BM and BB, given that IB and
MB are respectively symmetric to BI and BM.
11 It is relatively easy to verify that in the interval region of interest (γ >γ, see Lemma 1), the system is stable and
equilibrium prices and profits are always positive.
12When one pair merges and bundles, per firm profit is half of the profit of the merged entity.
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Table 2: Market stage equilibrium prices and profits
Case EQUILIBRIUM PRICES PER FIRM EQUILIBRIUM PROFITS
II pIIαi = p
II
βi
= (1−γ)(2δ−γ−1)
(2δ−γ)(1−γ)−2(1−δ2)
πIIi =
(2δ2−γ−1)(1−γ)(2δ−γ−1)
(2δ+γ+1)[(2δ−γ)(1−γ)−2(1−δ2)]
2
pIIαj = p
II
βj
= (1−γ)(2δ−γ−1)
(2δ−γ)(1−γ)−2(1−δ2)
πIIj =
(2δ2−γ−1)(1−γ)(2δ−γ−1)
(2δ+γ+1)[(2δ−γ)(1−γ)−2(1−δ2)]
2
MI pMIai = p
MI
βi
=
(1−γ)[2+γ(3+γ)−6δ2]
Ψ π
MI
i =
(1−γ)(1+δ)[2+γ(3+γ)−6δ2]
2
Ψ2(1+γ+2δ)
pMIaj = p
MI
βj
= (1−γ)(1+γ−2δ)(2+γ+3δ)Ψ π
MI
j =
(1−γ)(1+γ−2δ)(1+γ−2δ2)(2+γ+3δ)2
Ψ2(1+γ+2δ)
MM pMMαi = p
MM
βi
= 1−γ2+δ−γ π
MM
i =
(1−γ)(1+δ)
(2δ+γ+1)(2+δ−γ)2
pMMαj = p
MM
βj
= 1−γ2+δ−γ π
MM
j =
(1−γ)(1+δ)
(2δ+γ+1)(2+δ−γ)2
BI pBIαβi =
(1−γ)[4−γ(γ−2+4δ)+δ(4−5δ)]
2[2−γ(γ+2δ)+δ(3−δ−δ2)]
πBIi =
(1−γ)(1+δ)[4−γ(γ−2+4δ)−δ(4−5δ)]2
16(1+γ+2δ)[2−γ(γ+2δ)+δ(3−δ−δ2)]
2
pBIαj = p
BI
βj
= (1−γ)(1−δ)(2+γ+3δ)
2[2−γ(γ+2δ)+δ(3−δ−δ2)]
πBIj =
(1−γ)(1+δ)(2+γ+3δ)2[2(1+δ)−(γ+δ)2]
8(1+γ+2δ)[2−γ(γ+2δ)+δ(3−δ−δ2)]
2
BM pBMαβi =
2(1−γ)
2+δ−γ π
BM
i =
(1−γ)(1+δ)
(2δ+γ+1)(2+δ−γ)2
pBMαj = p
BM
βj
= 1−γ2+δ−γ π
BM
j =
(1−γ)(1+δ)
(2δ+γ+1)(2+δ−γ)2
BB pBBαβi =
2(1−γ)
2+δ−γ π
BB
i =
(1−γ)(1+δ)
(1+2δ+γ)(2+δ−γ)2
pBBαβj =
2(1−γ)
2+δ−γ π
BB
j =
(1−γ)(1+δ)
(1+2δ+γ)(2+δ−γ)2
where Ψ = 4− γ2(1 + γ) + δ(2 + δ)(1− 6δ) + γ [4 + δ(4 + 5δ)].
We can now proceed by solving the simultaneous game and obtain:
Proposition 1 Depending on the interaction between product complementarity and brand substi-
tutability, the following holds:
• When γ ∈ (γ,−δ), we have one Nash Equilibrium in (weakly) dominant strategies given
by (M, M), which is also Pareto efficient.
• When γ ∈ (−δ, γII), we have one Nash Equilibrium in (weakly) dominant strategies given
by (B, B), which is also Pareto efficient.
• When γ ∈ (γII , γMB), the game is a Prisoner’s Dilemma as the unique Nash Equilibrium
(B, B) is Pareto dominated by (I, I).
• When γ ∈ (γMB, 1), we have two Nash Equilibria given by (B, I) and (I,B).
Proof. see the Appendix.
As the analytical expressions of the above threshold values of γ are rather complicated, the
parametric regions of interest in the bidimensional space, delimited by δ ∈ (−1, 0) and γ ∈ (0, 1), is
represented in Figure 1. For future reference, γMM is also depicted. The dashed area in γ ∈ (0, γ)
has no economic meaning, following Lemma 1.
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Our results deserve additional explanations. In particular, we need to focus on the incentives
to merge with respect to those to bundle. Let us neglect for the moment the possibility to bundle
and focus on the decision to merge. As already established, two merging complementors end up by
setting lower prices as they internalize the positive externality that a price reduction of each product
has on the demand of the other. Considering pair i, it is easy to verify that a merger results in lower
prices both, when rivals remain independent and when they merge:
pMIxi < p
II
xi
and pMMxi < p
IM
xi
, x = α, β. (18)
Yet, the effectiveness of such price internalization depends on the relative strength of δ and γ,
as we can infer from Proposition 1. In particular: (i) πMIi > π
II
i when γ < γ
MI , (ii) πMMi > π
IM
i
when γ < γMM , and (iii) πMMi > π
II
i when γ < γ
II . Moreover γ < γII < γMI  γMM < γMB, as
can be observed in Figure 1, where we also notice that such threshold values are decreasing in δ.13
Moreover, we find that:
pMIxj > p
II
xj
and pMMxj > p
IM
xj
when γ < −δ, x = α, β. (19)
When γ < −δ, producers in pair j set a higher price in response to a merger in pair i.
Starting in γ < −δ and supposing that A1 and B1 merge, prices for α1 and β1 decrease substan-
tially and so quantities increase. Moreover, A2 and B2, either independently or in a merger, respond
13See the Proof of Proposition 1 in the Appendix, with particular reference to espressions (A3), (A4), (A8) and (A9).
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by charging higher prices, as their goods, α2 and β2 are still sufficiently differentiated from α1 and
β1 and/or sufficiently complementary to β1 and α1, respectively, whose sales have significantly in-
creased. Product complementarity is therefore stronger than brand substitutability. The merger
between A1 and B1 would allow to lower prices and gain in quantities without eliciting an aggressive
answer by rivals, which would also raise prices if they cannot merge. Obviously, the same incentive
holds for the other pair, thus explaining why they both merge.
The picture changes when γ > −δ, especially when we proceed northeastward on Figure 1. On
the one hand, the intensity of the Cournot effect diminishes as products are perceived as less and
less complementary. On the other hand, brand substitutability increases, and rivals respond to a
merger by lowering their price. This exacerbates price competition without a compensating increase
in sales: firms prefer to not merge. When the degree of brand substitutability exceeds the threshold
value γII , both pairs of complementors would be better off by remaining independent, but their
dominant strategy is still merging. Only when γ > γMI ≃ γMM they would both decide to refrain
from merging. Absent bundling, therefore, we would have a prisoner’s dilemma in γ ∈ (γII , γMM).
Now we introduce bundling. First of all, from Table 1, notice that:
πMMy = π
BM
y = π
BB
y , y = i, j (20)
Remark 1 When both pairs of complementors merge, bundling becomes ineffective.
When two complementors merge, they have no incentive to bundle their products if the other
complementors decide to merge as well. The reason lies in the fact that, when both pairs of com-
plementors merge, we start from a symmetric "coordinated" position in which firms charge the
same prices and sell the same quantity. It comes therefore as no surprise that at equilibrium
pBMαβi = p
BB
αβi
= pMMαi + p
MM
βi
: the bundling pair plugs in the package the same amount of units
of each product and charges for it a price which is the sum of the prices charged for each stand-alone
product. As a consequence the profit does not change with respect to the no bundling case.
The situation is different when one pair of complementors remains independent.
Lemma 3 If rivals remain independent, the price of the bundle is different from the sum of the
prices of the stand-alone products . In particular:
• When γ ∈ (γ,−δ): pBIαβi < p
MI
αi
+ pMIβi < p
II
αi
+ pIIβi .
• When γ ∈ (−δ, γP ): pMIαi + p
MI
βi
< pBIαβi < p
II
αi
+ pIIβi .
• When γ ∈ (γP , 1): pMIαi + p
MI
βi
< pIIαi + p
II
βi
< pBIαβi .
Proof. see the Appendix.
The results of Lemma 3 are very interesting as they confirm that (pure) bundling can be used
to revert the price drop induced by the merger. In particular, bundling yields a price increase when
γ > −δ where, recalling Lemma 2, the bundle is a substitute for the alternative goods produced by
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rival complementors. Absent bundling, rivals would respond to a merger by lowering prices, as we
know from (19). Selling the two products in a bundle can therefore be used by pair i to soften price
competition, given that pBIαβi > p
MI
αi
+ pMIβi when γ > −δ. Independent rivals in j now respond by
charging higher prices: pBIxj > p
MI
xj
. Hence, it is no surprise that πBIi > π
MI
i and bundling is thus
preferred to only merging when γ > −δ, as we know from Proposition 1.14
In addition, in γ ∈ (γP , 1), when brands become almost homogeneous (and/or product comple-
mentary tends to fade away), pair i can even charge for the bundle a price that is higher than the sum
of the prices it would have charged for the two independently produced goods: pBIαβi > p
II
αi
+ pIIβi .
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Independent producers in j respond again by charging higher prices (pBIxj > p
II
xj
) and πBIi > π
II
i in
our interval region.16 As a consequence:
pBIαβi < p
BI
αj
+ pBIβj . (21)
Remark 2 When rival complementors remain independent, the bundling entity charges a price for
the bundle which is lower than the sum of the prices charged by the two rivals.
The previous discussion has two implications. On the one hand, it spells out the incentives for
each pair of complementors to bundle in γ > −δ. On the other hand, it opens up the possibility for
independent rivals to gain as well, as prices rise. There exists therefore a trade-off for independent
complementors in j when pair i decides to (merge and) bundle: re-activating price competition via
(merging and) bundling, thus recouping market shares, or remaining independent and charging higher
prices in a smaller portion of the market. The trade-off can be easily navigated:17
πBIj < π
BM
j ⇐⇒ γ < γ
MB; moreover, γMB ≃ γP . (22)
In γ ∈ (−δ, γMB ≃ γP ) both pairs of complementors opt for bundling. By doing so, they obtain the
same profits as if they would have merged without bundling, as highlighted in Remark 1. This also
explains the prisoner’s dilemma in γ ∈ (γII , γMB), where πBBi = π
MM
i > π
II
i and both pairs would
obtain a higher profit by remaining independent.
Only in γ ∈ (γMB ≃ γP , 1), hence in presence of a significant surge in prices driven by bundling
adopted by one pair, rival complementors prefer to remain independent. This happens when the
competitive pressure is very strong as the degree of brand substitutability is very high and/or the
degree of product complementarity is low. In such circumstances, bundling allows to increase prices
without eliciting an aggressive answer by rivals, which prefer to raise prices as well instead of exac-
erbating price competition in a market where brands are almost homogeneous. These asymmetric
equilibria can be interpreted in terms of co-opetition: the merging-bundling strategy adopted by one
pair generates a positive effect also on rivals which prefer to produce separately.
14 In particular, see (A6) in the Appendix and remember that πBMi = π
MM
i = π
MB
i = π
BB
i (Remark 1).
15 In the literature, a form of bundling in which the bundle price is higher than the sum of separate prices is known
as ‘premium bundling’ (since Cready, 1991).
16As we can see from (A7) in the Appendix.
17 In particular, see (A5) in the Appendix and remember that, by symmetry, πBMj ≡ π
MB
i
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4 The sequential game
In this section we consider the more realistic situation in which one pair of complementors moves
before the other in the preliminary stage of the game. We have therefore two substages in the
preliminary stage of the game. Without loss of generality, we assume that pair i moves first and
selects a strategy from the set {I, M, B}. The other pair of complementors j faces the same decision
in the second sub-stage, after having observed the strategy selected by pair i. The preliminary stage
of the game is represented in extensive form in Figure 2.
Figure 2
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For notational purposes, recalling Remark 1, we denote as M/B the strategy of the firm when it
is indifferent between merging with bundling and merging without bundling. Equilibrium results of
the market stage for different combinations of strategies selected by the two pairs of complementors
are in Table 1, where the first (resp. second) superscript now denotes the strategy of first-mover
pair i (resp. second-mover j). By proceeding backwards and comparing the appropriate equilibrium
profits, we find that:
Proposition 2 when one pair of complementors moves first, the following holds:
• when γ ∈ (γ, γMM), both pairs of complementors merge (with or without bundling) and
the resulting SPNE is (M/B, M/B);
• when γ ∈ (γMM , γMB), the first mover opts for merging without bundling, while the other
pair of complementors remains independent and the SPNE is (M,I);
• when γ ∈ (γMB, 1), the first pair of complementors merges and bundles, while rivals
remain independent; the SPNE is therefore given by (B,I).
Proof. see the Appendix.
We can still refer to Figure 1 to visualize the areas of interest. The interaction between product
complementarity and brand substitutability plays again a crucial role in determining which strategies
are selected at equilibrium by the two pairs of complementors.
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The first and the third interval region do not require further attention. As has been carefully
explained in the previous section, when γ ∈ (γ, γMM), the first pair of complementors merge thereby
inciting a merger between the second pair. There is only one caveat with respect to the previous
section. As, in this region, remaining independent is not a profitable option for either pair, the
decision to bundle becomes ineffective, as is known from Remark 1. Therefore, as merging with or
without bundling entails the same profit level, M/B is the strategy adopted by both pairs at the
subgame Nash Equilibrium. As for γ ∈ (γMB, 1), first movers can now merge and bundle, while
rivals prefer to remain independent to not activate a relatively fierce price competition.
On the contrary, the region γ ∈
(
γMM , γMB
)
is extremely interesting as it represents a situation in
which the strategic interplay between merging and bundling emerges in its true nature. In particular:
Corollary 1 In γ ∈
(
γMM , γMB
)
, pair i refrain from bundling to not induce rivals to merge.
As has been clearly shown in the simultaneous game, when γ > −δ each pair of comple-
mentors would (merge and) bundle if the other pair remained independent. Nonetheless, when
γ ∈
(
γMM , γMB
)
, if first-mover pair i adopts bundling, then complementors belonging to j would
merge (with or without bundling) as well, thus intensifying price competition.18 The alternative for
pair i is to merge without bundling, as this strategy would induce the others to remain independent.
Combining the results from Lemma 3 with pBMαβi vs. p
MI
αi
+ pMIβi , it is possible to demonstrate that,
in the region of interest:
pBMαβi < p
MI
αi
+ pMIβi < p
BI
αβi
. (23)
Pair i prefers therefore to avoid the aggressive response by pair j as this would imply a price for the
bundle which would turn out to be lower than the sum of the prices for unbundled goods when it
merges. This provides a valid support to justify the result that πMIi > π
BM
i in γ ∈
(
γMM , γMB
)
, as
we know from Proposition 2. In other words, when market pressure is intermediate, the first movers
merge but refrain from bundling in order to avoid a profit deteriorating contra merger by the second
pair of complementors in the second stage.
5 Welfare considerations and policy indications
A very crucial point of our paper is the strategic interaction between bundling and merging. The
beneficial effect of a merger between complementors has to be evaluated vis à vis the negative effect
that can arise when the merging entity resorts to bundling. As we have demonstrated, the bundling
strategy, when adopted by only one pair of complementors, drives prices up and reduces consumer
surplus. On the other hand, the bundling pair can resort to bundling to dampen the negative effects
of lower levels of both brand differentiation and product complementarity:
∣∣∣∣∂π
BI
i
∂γ
∣∣∣∣ <
∣∣∣∣∂π
II
i
∂γ
∣∣∣∣ and
∣∣∣∣∂π
BI
i
∂δ
∣∣∣∣ <
∣∣∣∣∂π
II
i
∂δ
∣∣∣∣ when γ > −δ. (24)
18For this and the following statements, see the demonstration of Proposition 2 in the Appendix.
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Moreover, independent rivals may gain as well, as we highlighted in γ ∈ (γMB, 1). Bundling increases
therefore producer surplus.
It follows that the potential effect of bundling on social welfare, defined as the sum of consumer
surplus and firms’ profits, is at least ambiguous. By comparing social welfare in the different combi-
nations of strategies available for players, we find:
Proposition 3 In the relevant parametric region defined by Lemma 1: SWBB = SWMM =
SWBM > SWMI > max
{
SW II , SWBI
}
. Moreover, SW II > SWBI when γ > γSW , where
γ < γSW < γMM < γMB.
Proof. see the Appendix.
Moreover, as we considered two different time sequences that characterize the preliminary stage
of the game, we have to show how this may affect social welfare. In Figure 3 we summarize the most
important equilibrium results and the respective parametric regions that we found in the previous
sections. This will be useful to describe the welfare analysis that emerges from Proposition 3.
Figure 3a : the simultaneous game Figure 3b : the sequential game
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First of all, social welfare is highest when both pairs merge. As already established, this is due to
the fact that the overall price level decreases when complementors internalize the price externality.
Moreover, as is known from Remark 1, bundling becomes ineffective in presence of coordinated
price decisions made by rivals. This explains why SWBB = SWMM = SWBM . From the welfare
standpoint, this confirms that the potential negative impact of bundling is completely neutralized
when alternative producers can merge (and bundle) as well.
The equilibrium analysis reveals that the simultaneous game provides a larger area in which social
welfare is maximized, given that SWBB = SWMM in γ ∈ (γ, γMB). The sequential game reproduces
such a favorable result only in γ ∈ (γ, γMM). In γ ∈ (γMM , γMB), as stated in Corollary 1, the
first-mover pair merges without bundling, and rivals prefer to produce separately in order to not
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exacerbate price competition. From welfare standpoint, this implies a social welfare loss equal to
SWMM − SWMI , as only the second best solution is reached.
On the contrary, social welfare is at its lowest either when both pairs of complementors remain
independent, or when one engages in bundling, and the other remain independent. The latter case
deserves specific attention as it implies a specific action, taken by two complementors, which has a
negative impact on society. In particular, the price increase due to bundling and the concomitant
negative effect on consumer surplus is not offset by a sufficient profit gain for producers. It follows
that a policy maker should prohibit bundling when the other pair has no incentive to merge as well.
Notice that our theoretical model leaves open the possibility for each pair of complementors to merge.
It is therefore a strategic decision, and not a de facto imposition, to remain independent.
This finding is very interesting and it may, at first sight, even seem counterintuitive, given that
it involves a situation in which the merged firm bundles two products which are considered as very
similar to those provided by two alternative producers (γ > γSW ). A consumer who is only interested
in good α can still buy αj , which characteristics are are very similar to those of αi. However, as we
know from the analysis of the interval region γ ∈ (γMB, 1), bundling increases both the price of the
bundle and that of αj and the consumer would unambiguously suffer. Bundling should therefore be
prohibited in such a parametric region.
One would be tempted to think that in our framework pure bundling, in absence of cost synergies,
is always socially detrimental and should therefore be prohibited tout court. This is not true. Fol-
lowing our previous analysis, one can easily verify that, without bundling, both in the simultaneous
and in the sequential game, the equilibrium would be (I, I) in γ ∈ (γMM , 1). While this reduces the
welfare loss in γ ∈ (γMB, 1), where (B, I) would be selected otherwise, prohibiting bundling would
generate a welfare loss when γ ∈ (γMM , γMB), by not allowing to reach first best (B, B) in the
simultaneous game, or second best (M, I) in the sequential game.19
One last remark. In the cases presented in the introduction, one of the major concern was the
difficulty for rivals to be able to merge and compete with such a conglomerate as Comcast/NBC, for
example. In our paper we assumed that individual producers decide whether to merge or not, and
this option is costless. In presence of a costly, long or simply very difficult merging processes, the
negative effect of bundling on social welfare would be even more evident, as the merged entity would
decide to bundle in the large parametric region where (γ + δ) > 0.
6 Conclusions and extensions
In this paper, the strategic interplay between the merging and bundling decisions by two pairs of
complementors is analyzed. This strategic interaction is shown to depend on the intensity of market
pressure and on the nature of the game. The latter depends on whether producers play simultane-
ously or sequentially in the preliminary stage of the game. Competitive pressure is measured by the
combination between brand differentiation within the same market and product complementarity be-
19See also Figure A in the Appendix for a graphical representation of social welfare ranking.
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tween markets. This represents one of the most important novelty of our paper, given that we admit
different degrees of both product complementarity and brand substitutability. Although strongly
inspired by recent antitrust decisions, the predictions of our model are not therefore confined to the
study of composite systems that require both complements to work.
When competitive pressure is low (brands are very differentiated and/or product complementarity
is relatively high), both pairs of complementors decide to merge and bundling becomes ineffective.
This happens in both the simultaneous and the sequential game, and hence the first move does
not convey any significant advantage. Social welfare is at its highest, as a double merger favours
consumers by lowering prices.
On the contrary, when market competition is very intense, first movers opt for merging and
bundling, while second mover remain independent as they can increase their prices. The surge in the
overall price level results in the lowest possible level of social welfare. Bundling in this parametric
region should therefore be prohibited by the antitrust agency.
The region where competitive pressure is intermediate deserves special attention, as it shows
the strategic interplay between bundling and merging at its full force. In the simultaneous game
both pairs of complementors bundle, and this may result in a Prisoner’s dilemma as remaining
independent would yield a higher payoff. In the more realistic sequential game, first movers merge
without engaging in bundling. They do so in order to avoid a profit-harming merger by second
movers, which prefer therefore to remain independent. Without bundling, however, in this region
both pairs would stay independent, thus reducing social welfare. Hence, for an intermediate degree
of market competition, one could, with caution, argue that bundling has a positive effect on social
welfare.
Of course, this paper is not without some caveats. In particular, we used a simple scenario in
which firms are a priori identical and where we assumed symmetry concerning the degree of brand
substitutability and the degree of product complementarity. Moreover, we limit our attention to
pure bundling. The theoretical model that we adopt may give rise to algebraic complications when
studying mixed bundling. However, we believe that this does not alter the quality of our results, as
it allows to examine the strategic interplay between the incentive to merge and bundle vis-à-vis an
analogous decision by rivals, which was the object of our paper.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
Due to the symmetric structure of the system, it suffices to verify that: (i)
∂qαi
∂pαi
< 0 (ii)
∂qαi
∂pαj
> 0
, and (iii)
∂qαi
∂pβi
=
∂qαi
∂pβj
< 0. In the parametric region delimited by δ ∈ (−1, 0) and γ ∈ (0, 1), we
find that the binding condition derives from
∂qαi
∂pαj
> 0,which is satisfied when γ >
1
2
(
√
1 + 8δ2 − 1).
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Proof of Lemma 2
From (10)-(11) we find that:
∂qαβi
∂pαj
=
∂qαβi
∂pβj
=
∂qαj
∂pαβi
=
∂qβj
∂pαβi
=
γ + δ
2 (1− γ) (1 + γ + 2δ)
; (A1)
similarly, from (16):
∂qαβi
∂pαβj
=
γ + δ
2 (1− γ) (1 + γ + 2δ)
. (A2)
The two expressions are equivalent, and their sign only depends on the numerator, which is posi-
tive when γ + δ > 0, and negative otherwise. Indeed, looking at the denominator, we know that
2 (1− γ) (1 + γ + 2δ) > 0⇔ γ > (−2δ − 1) but γ=
1
2
(
√
1 + 8δ2 − 1) > (−2δ − 1) by which the sign
of 2 (1− γ) (1 + γ + 2δ) is always positive in γ >γ.
Proof of Proposition 1
From Table 2, notice that πMMy = π
BM
y = π
BB
y , y = i, j. Focusing on pair i (pair j is symmetric),
the other relevant profit comparisons are:
πMIi > π
II
i ⇐⇒ γ < γ
MI ; (A3)
πMMi > π
IM
i ≡ π
MI
j ⇐⇒ γ < γ
MM ; (A4)
πMBi > π
IB
i ≡ π
BI
j ⇐⇒ γ < γ
MB; (A5)
πBIi > π
MI
i ⇐⇒ γ + δ > 0, i.e.γ > −δ; (A6)
πBIi > π
II
i always in γ ∈ (γ, 1). (A7)
πMMi > π
II
i ⇐⇒ γ < γ
II ; (A8)
The explicit algebraic expressions of the above threshold values of γ are not reported in order
to avoid tedious algebraic formulas. Moreover, in the parametric region under investigation, it is
possible to verify that
γ < −δ < γII < γMI  γMM < γMB < 1. (A9)
We then have to consider six subintervals:
1. In γ ∈ (γ,−δ), merging without bundling (M) is dominant strategy for pair i given that:
πMIi > π
BI
i > π
II
i , π
MM
i = π
BM
i > π
IM
i and π
MB
i = π
BB
i > π
IB
i . The same obviously holds
for symmetric pair j. Moreover, πMMi = π
BB
i > π
II
i . The unique Nash equilibrium in (weakly)
dominant strategies is (M, M), which is also Pareto dominant.
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2. In γ ∈ (−δ, γII), the important change with respect to the previous case is that bundling
becomes the dominant strategy as πBIi > π
MI
i ; it follows that π
BI
i > π
MI
i > π
II
i , and similarly
for player j. The Nash equilibrium in (weakly) dominant strategies is therefore (B, B), which
is also Pareto dominant as πBBi = π
MM
i > π
II
i .
3. In γ ∈ (γII , γMI), the only difference with respect to the previous case is that πMMi = π
BB
i <
πIIi . Bundling is still dominant strategy for both players, but the game is a prisoner’s dilemma
given that the Nash equilibrium (B, B) is Pareto dominated by (I, I).
4. The subinterval γ ∈ (γMI , γMM) is very small as the two threshold values tend to coincide.
Now πIIi > π
MI
i , but this does not alter the dominance given that π
BI
i > π
II
i > π
MI
i . The
Nash equilibrium in (weakly) dominant strategies is still represented by (B, B) and the game
is again a prisoner’s dilemma.
5. In γ ∈ (γMM , γMB) the situation is more complicated. As in the previous interval, πBIi >
πIIi > π
MI
i . Differently from before, however, now π
MM
i = π
BM
i < π
IM
i , and bundling is not
anymore a dominant strategy for i: when rival pair j opts for merging, complementors in i
would prefer to remain independent. Nonetheless, (I, M) is not a Nash equilibrium, as rivals in
j would respond by bundling when observing that complementors in i remain independent (by
symmetry, πIBj > π
II
j > π
IM
j ). But given that it continues to hold that π
MB
i = π
BB
i > π
IB
i ,
i would prefer to bundle as well when j bundles. The unique Nash equilibrium is represented
again by (B, B), which is Pareto dominated by (I, I), as we already know.
6. Finally, in γ ∈ (γMB, 1), πIBi > π
MB
i = π
BB
i (and obviously π
BI
j > π
BM
j = π
BB
j ) This,
combined with the fact that πBIi > π
II
i > π
MI
i (and π
IB
j > π
II
j > π
IM
j ), demonstrates the
existence of two Nash equilibria: (B, I) and (I, B). In this region we have therefore a chicken
game with two asymmetric equilibria along the secondary diagonal.
As a consequence, considering that subintervals 3, 4 and 5 provide the same outcome, we find the
four relevant parametric regions that are reported in Proposition 1.
Proof of Lemma 3
Consider pair of complementors i and the equilibrium prices which appear in Table 2. When
rivals in j remain independent, we find that:
pBIαβi > p
II
αi
+ pIIβi ⇐⇒ γ > γ
P ; (A10)
pBIαβi > p
MI
αi
+ pMIβi ⇐⇒ γ + δ > 0, i.e.γ > −δ. (A11)
Moreover, we already know that pMIαi + p
MI
βi
< pIIαi + p
II
βi
due to the Cournot effect. For the reasons
explained before, the explicit expressions of γP is omitted. However, it is relatively simple to find
that
γ < −δ < γP < 1. (A12)
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By combining the above ranking with the results in (A10) and (A11), we obtain the price in-
equalities reported in the three different regions of interest.
Proof of Proposition 2
Let us proceed backwardly and analyze the decision of player j in response to the strategy selected
by player i:
(i) If i remains independent (I), then j compares πIIj with π
IM
j and π
IB
j . From Table 1 we
know the value of πIIj and, by symmetry, π
IM
j = π
MI
i and π
IB
j = π
BI
i . Considering (A3), (A6) and
(A7), respectively, we find then that πIMj > π
II
j ⇐⇒ γ < γ
MI , πIBj > π
II
j always and π
IB
j > π
IM
j
⇐⇒ γ > −δ. From (A9), the following ranking applies: γ < −δ < γMI < 1. This, combined with
the previous profit comparisons, indicates that j responds by merging (M) in γ ∈ (γ,−δ), while it
merges and bundles (B) in γ ∈ (−δ, 1). Player j gets πIMj in the former parametric region and π
IB
j in
the latter one.
(ii) If i decides to merge (M), then j compares πMIj with π
MM
j = π
MB
j (= π
BM
j ). From (A4) we
know that πMMj = π
MM
i > π
MI
j ⇐⇒ γ < γ
MM , where γMM > γ. It follows that j opts for merging
(with or without bundling, hence M/B) in γ ∈ (γ, γMM), obtaining πMMj = π
MB
j , while it remains
independent (I) in γ ∈ (γMM , 1) and gets πMIj .
(iii) If i merges and adopts bundling (B), rival pair j contrasts πBIj and π
BB
j = π
BM
j . From (A5)
we easily obtain that πMBi = π
BB
j > π
IB
i ≡ π
BI
j ⇐⇒ γ < γ
MB, where γMB > γ. Hence, player j
merges (with or without bundling, M/B) in γ ∈ (γ, γMB) and gets πBBj = π
BM
j , while it remains
independent (I) in γ ∈ (γMB, 1), where its profit is given by πBIj .
We can now consider the strategy adopted by player i, which anticipates the best response of the
rival. From (A9) we know that, in δ ∈ (−1, 0) the γ-threshold values of interest can be ranked as
follows: γ < −δ < γMM < γMB < 1. We then have to consider four subintervals:
1. In γ ∈ (γ,−δ), the follower j opts for M when it observes that i remains independent (I), while it
plays M/B otherwise. First mover i compares therefore πIMi with π
BM
i = π
MB
i = π
MM
i = π
BB
i .
We already know that πMMj = π
MM
i > π
MI
j = π
IM
i ⇐⇒ γ < γ
MM , with −δ < γMM . It
follows that in this first region player i decides to merge (with or without bundling), and as a
consequence player j does the same. The subgame perfect equilibrium is (M/B, M/B)
2. In γ ∈ (−δ, γMM), the only difference is that player j decides to bundle (B) if i selects I, while it
continues to play M/B otherwise. Player i now confronts πIBi with π
BM
i = π
MB
i = π
MM
i = π
BB
i .
Again, we know that πMMj = π
MM
i > π
BI
j = π
IB
i ⇐⇒ γ < γ
MB. Given that γMM < γMB,
also in this region player i merges (with or without bundling), and the same does player j. The
subgame perfect equilibrium is therefore the same as in region 1.
3. In γ ∈ (γMM , γMB) the situation is more complicated, as player j respectively: bundles (B)
when i plays I ; remains independent (I) when i selects M ; merges with or without bundling
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(M/B) when i opts for B. First mover i then compares πIBi , π
MI
i and π
BM
i = π
BB
i . From
the previous point πMMi = π
BM
i > π
IB
i ⇐⇒ γ < γ
MB; moreover, we find that πMIi > π
MM
i
⇐⇒ γ > −δ. These results, combined with the previous ranking of threshold values of γ,
imply that in this third interval region πMIi > π
MM
i = π
BM
i > π
IB
i . Player i hence opts for
merging without bundling, and as a consequence j remains independent. The subgame perfect
equilibrium is (M, I).
4. In γ ∈ (γMB, 1), player j continues to bundle (B) when i selects I, while it decides to remain
independent (I) when i opts for either M or B. Player i now compares πIBi , π
MI
i and π
BI
i .
Algebraic calculations confirm that πBIi > π
MI
i ⇐⇒ γ > −δ and π
BI
i > π
IB
i ⇐⇒ γ > −δ. As
γMB > −δ, in our last interval region player i chooses bundling, and j remains independent.
The subgame perfect equilibrium is (B, I).
Proof of Proposition 3
When both pairs of complementors remain independent, consumer surplus can be easily com-
puted:
CSII =
2
(
1 + γ − 2δ2
)2
(1 + γ + 2δ)
[
γ2 − γ(1 + 2δ)− 2(1− δ − δ2)
]2 (A13)
By summing up consumer surplus and the profit of the four producers (see Table 1), social welfare
amounts to:
SW II =
2
(
1 + γ − 2δ2
) [
3− 2γ2 − 2δ(2 + δ) + γ(1 + 4δ)
]
(1 + γ + 2δ)
[
γ2 − γ(1 + 2δ)− 2(1− δ − δ2)
]2 . (A14)
When both merge without bundling, consumer surplus and social welfare are respectively given
by:
CSMM =
2(1 + δ)2
(1 + γ + 2δ) (2 + δ − γ)2
, (A15)
SWMM =
2(1 + δ) (3− 2γ + δ)
(1 + γ + 2δ) (2 + δ − γ)2
. (A16)
In the asymmetric case where one pair merges (without bundling) and the other remains inde-
pendent:
CSMI =
Γ
(1 + γ + 2δ) {4− γ2(1 + γ) + δ(2 + δ)(1− 6δ) + γ [4 + δ(4 + 5δ)]}2
, (A17)
where
Γ = 2(1 + γ)2(2 + γ)2 + 2δ(1 + γ)2(2 + γ)(5 + γ)− 3δ2(1 + γ) [9 + (4− γ)γ] +
−δ3 {97 + γ [145 + γ(43 + 3γ)]} − 2δ4(5 + γ)(1 + 5γ) + 24δ5 + 72δ6,
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and:
SWMI =
Θ
(1 + γ + 2δ) {4− γ2(1 + γ) + δ(2 + δ)(1− 6δ) + γ [4 + δ(4 + 5δ)]}2
(A18)
where
Θ = 2(1 + γ)2(2 + γ)2(3− γ) + 2δ(1 + γ)(2 + γ) {9 + γ [9− γ(5 + γ)]}+
−δ2(1 + γ) {121− γ [36 + γ(45 + 4γ)]} − δ3 {197 + γ [193− γ(65 + 37γ)]}+
+2δ4 [61− γ(86 + 11γ)] + 24δ5(11− 5γ) + 72δ6.
Now we can consider bundling: when one pair (merges) and bundles, while the other remain
independent, we find:
CSBI =
(1 + δ) ·∆
16(1 + γ + 2δ)
[
2− γ(γ + 2δ) + δ(3− δ − δ2)
]2 (A19)
where:
∆ = 32 + 3γ5 + γ4(1 + 24δ) + 2γ2 {δ [δ(56δ − 27)− 52]− 8}+ γ3(74δ2 − 20− 8δ) +
+δ {112 + δ(76 + δ [δ(32δ − 55)− 80]}+ γ
[
32− δ(2− δ)(87δ2 + 78δ − 4)
]
,
SWBN =
(1 + δ) [2(1− γ)Υ +∆]
16(1 + γ + 2δ)
[
2− γ(γ + 2δ) + δ(3− δ − δ2)
]2 (A20)
where:
Υ =
{
[4− γ(γ − 2 + 4δ)− δ(4− 5δ)]2 + 2(2 + γ + 3δ)2
[
2(1 + δ)− (γ + δ)2
]}
Finally, consumer surplus and total welfare in BM an BB are the same as in MM, as we know
from Remark 1. Hence:
CSBM = CSBB = CSMM ; SWBM = SWBB = SWMM . (A21)
Using Mathematica, it is possible to demonstrate that, in the admissible interval region defined
by Lemma 1:
SWBM = SWBB = SWMM > SWMI > SW II . (A22)
The last comparisons involves SWBI . We find that SWMI > SWBI and:
SW II > SWBI ⇐⇒ γ > γSW . (A23)
Moreover, γ < γSW < γMM < γMB. Additional calculations are available upon request. However,
as they imply algebraic expressions which have been evaluated through Mathematica, we decided not
to write their explicit expression in the text. To help the reader, however, we represent in Figure A
the threshold value γSW together with γMM in the parametric region of interest.
22
Figure A : Social welfare ranking
-1 0
1
γ
δ
γMM
γSW
γ
SWBI > SW II
SWBI < SW II
































































































































 
References
[1] Brandenburger, A. and B. Nalebuff (1996), Co-opetition, Doubleday: New York.
[2] Carbajo, J., De Meza, D. and D.J. Seidman (1990), A strategic motivation for commodity
bundling, Journal of Industrial Economics, 38, 283-298.
[3] Carlton, D. and M. Waldman (2002), The Strategic Use of Tying to Preserve and Create Market
Power in Evolving Industries, RAND Journal of Economics, 47, 194-220.
[4] Casadesus-Masanell, R., Nalebuff, B. and D. B. Yoffie (2008). Competing Complements. Harvard
Business School Working Paper, No. 09-009.
[5] Chen, Y. (1997), Equilibrium product bundling, Journal of Business, 70, 85-103.
[6] Choi, J. P. (2008), Mergers with Bundling in Complementary Markets, Journal of Industrial
Economics, 56, 553-577.
[7] Choi, J. P. and C. Stefanadis (2001), Tying, Investment, and the Dynamic Leverage Theory,
RAND Journal of Economics, 32, 52-71.
[8] Cournot, A. (1927), Researches into the Mathematical Principles of the Theory of Wealth,
published in French in 1838, translated by Nathaniel Bacon (Macmillan, New York).
[9] Cready, W. M. (1991), Premium Bundling, Economic Inquiry, 29, 173-79.
23
[10] Dalkir, S., Eisenstadt, D., Gerstle, A. and R. T. Masson (2002), Complementary Goods,
Monopoly vs. Monopoly Power: A Reassessment of Merger Effects, MiCRA WP, Feb 2002.
[11] Denicolò, V. (2000), Compatibility and Bundling with Generalist and Specialist Firms, Journal
of Industrial Economics, 48, 177-188.
[12] Dixit, A. (1979), A model of duopoly suggesting a theory of entry barriers, Bell Journal of
Economics, 10, 20-32.
[13] Economides, N. (1989), Desirability of Compatibility in the Absence of Network Externalities,
American Economic Review, 79, 1165-1181.
[14] Economides, N. and S. C. Salop (1992), Competition and Integration among Complements, and
Network Market Structure, Journal of Industrial Economics, 40, pp. 105—123.
[15] Evans, D. S. and M. Salinger (2002), Competition Thinking at the European
[16] Commission: Lessons from the Aborted GE-Honeywell Merger, George Mason Law Review, 10,
489—532.
[17] Farrell, J., Monroe, H. K. and G. Saloner (1998), The Vertical Organization of Industry: Incom-
patibility versus Compatibility, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 7, 143-182.
[18] Gans, J. S. and S. P. King (2006), Paying for Loyalty: Product Bundling in Oligopoly, Journal
of Industrial Economics, 54, 43-62.
[19] Mantovani, A. (2011), The Strategic Effect of Bundling: a New Perspective, mimeo.
[20] Martin, S. (1999), Strategic and welfare implications of bundling, Economics Letters, 62, 371-
376.
[21] Matutes, C. and P. Regibeau (1988), Mix and Match: Product Compatibility Without Network
Externalities, Rand Journal of Economics, 19, 221-234.
[22] Matutes, C. and P. Regibeau (1992), Compatibility and Bundling of Complementary Goods in
a Duopoly, Journal of Industrial Economics, 40, 37-54.
[23] Morgan, E.J. and S. McGuire (2004), Transatlantic divergence: GE—Honeywell and the EU’s
merger policy, Journal of European Public Policy, 11, 39—56.
[24] Nalebuff, B. (2004), Bundling as an Entry Barrier, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119, 159-
187.
[25] Peitz M. (2008), Bundling may blockade entry, International Journal of Industrial Organization,
26, 41-58.
[26] Spence, A.M. (1976), Product differentiation and welfare, American Economic Review, 66, 407-
414.
[27] Whinston, M. D. (1990), Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion, American Economic Review, 80,
837-859.
24
 
